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Abstract: Human outbreaks with avian influenza have been, so far, constrained by poor viral
adaptation to non-avian hosts. This could be overcome via co-infection, whereby two strains share
genetic material, allowing new hybrid strains to emerge. Identifying areas where co-infection is
most likely can help target spaces for increased surveillance. Ecological niche modeling using
remotely-sensed data can be used for this purpose. H5N1 and H9N2 influenza subtypes are endemic
in Egyptian poultry. From 2006 to 2015, over 20,000 poultry and wild birds were tested at farms
and live bird markets. Using ecological niche modeling we identified environmental, behavioral,
and population characteristics of H5N1 and H9N2 niches within Egypt. Niches differed markedly by
subtype. The subtype niches were combined to model co-infection potential with known occurrences
used for validation. The distance to live bird markets was a strong predictor of co-infection. Using only
single-subtype influenza outbreaks and publicly available ecological data, we identified areas of
co-infection potential with high accuracy (area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve (AUC) 0.991).
Keywords: coinfection; Egypt; influenza; remote sensing; ecological niche modeling; geography;
medical; influenza A virus; H5N1 subtype; influenza A virus; H9N2 subtype
1. Introduction
Human infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 and other subtypes are
a continuing concern for global public health. Previous human outbreaks have been largely constrained
by poor viral adaptation to non-avian hosts [1]. This limitation could, potentially, be overcome via
reassortment, whereby two different strains co-infecting the same host share genetic material to create
new hybrid strains [2]. Most previous pandemics in humans were the results of such reassortment
events. Monitoring and mapping the movement of influenza viruses within bird populations and
identifying areas of co-infection potential can help in targeting surveillance efforts and intervention
campaigns [3]. Identification of ecological niches that are conducive to co-infection with different
influenza subtypes can indicate areas where novel reassortants may emerge. We hypothesize there
are such areas of overlapping niches and susceptible hosts in these places are at increased risk
of co-infection.
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2016, 13, 886; doi:10.3390/ijerph13090886 www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2016, 13, 886 2 of 17
HPAI H5N1 first emerged in Asia in 1996 and has since spread to become a panzootic. Due to its
high pathogenicity (in both poultry and human hosts) and wide geographic spread, H5N1 is often
considered one of the most likely pandemic candidates, with some insisting an H5N1 pandemic
is inevitable [4]. However, not all previous pandemics arose from HPAI viruses. It has also been
suggested H9N2, a low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus, which emerged in 1994, may be
an equally plausible candidate for the next pandemic virus [1,5]. H9N2 viruses are endemic in poultry
across a wide geographic range, have caused infections in humans and pigs, and are, at least in
some cases, partially adapted to recognize and bind to human receptors [6,7]. It is conceivable that
co-infection with H5N1 and H9N2 could produce a new subtype capable of infecting humans with
high pathogenicity.
Strong evidence suggests aquatic birds act as the natural reservoir host for the influenza virus,
and surveillance and intervention at the avian-human interface may be critical to the early identification
and eradication of the next potentially pandemic strain [1,8]. Most human infections with avian
influenza have been the result of direct contact with poultry, not wild birds, likely due to the much
higher rate of contact [9]. The potential for direct contact between humans and poultry is high in Egypt.
The majority of poultry production is carried out in commercial farms. Some 4–5 million Egyptian
families raise poultry at home in traditional backyard flocks, accounting for roughly a third of poultry
production in the country [10]. While commercial farms generally have high biosecurity limiting
poultry contact with potentially infected wild birds, backyard farms are characterized by outdoor
enclosures with little security. For example, a three-year study of backyard poultry growers in Egypt
found that none of the participants (n = 750) consistently used or decontaminated personal protective
equipment [11]. Egypt is an arid country in Northeastern Africa, containing just over one million
square kilometers of land, of which less than 3% is arable, mostly located in the Nile River valley
and delta [12]. Both human and poultry populations are most densely distributed in these arable
regions [13].
HPAI H5N1 was identified in Egyptian poultry in early 2006, and resulted in the loss of more than
90% of flocks that year [14]. Since that time, Egypt has reported more human cases of H5N1 influenza
than any other country, with 346 confirmed cases as of 31 December 2015 [15]. Egypt reported over
1000 outbreaks of H5N1 in poultry to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) before declaring
the disease as endemic in July 2008, less than two years after its introduction [16]. The economic impacts
have also been substantial. In addition to losses directly from sickness and death of infected birds,
mandatory culling of entire flocks upon detection of the virus has been enforced without compensation
for farmers, resulting in an estimated $2–3 billion USD in losses in the first four years [17].
Avian influenza subtype H9N2 was first identified in Egyptian poultry in 2011 and has caused
confirmed human infections [18]. Active surveillance of Egyptian poultry has detected co-infection
with both H5N1 and H9N2, which could potentially lead to reassortment [19]. As the spatial
distribution of influenza in Egyptian poultry is not uniform, and considering the relative scarcity of
co-infection data, we investigated a method to identify areas where poultry may be at increased risk of
co-infection in the absence of true co-infection data.
Ecological niche modeling (ENM) and the related species distribution modeling (SDM) were
developed by geographers and ecologists to predict the potential geographic occurrence of organisms
based on observed occurrences in niche space [20]. We define the niche as the combination of
environmental conditions (here, these include host populations and indirect indicators) within which
an organism can persist. ENM and SDM are sometimes used interchangeably; however, modeling
the processes that shape distributions and predicting the potential distribution in unsampled areas
assumes a niche-based hypothesis, so we will use the term ENM (for a detailed discussion, see [21,22],
but also see [23,24]). ENM is only possible on a broad scale with the use of remotely-sensed datasets,
which tend to have much higher spatial and temporal resolution than observational data, and cover
a considerably larger spatial extent [25,26]. Remotely-sensed data allow detailed modeling across
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very large regions, including areas where more traditional observational data are not available or are
severely outdated, a common problem in many developing countries, such as Egypt.
In this paper we identify areas with increased potential of co-infection outbreaks in poultry flocks
by modeling the ecological niches of H5N1 and H9N2 separately using known outbreak locations in
Northern Egypt, then observing where these niches overlap in geographic space. This overlap is then
compared with a niche model developed using actual co-infection occurrences to evaluate the models’
predictive ability. Additional models are developed to evaluate the transferability of niche estimates
into unsampled locations.
2. Materials and Methods
Three sources were used for outbreak data from 2007 to 2015: a systematic avian influenza
surveillance program between the Center of Scientific Excellence for Influenza Viruses in Egypt and the
St. Jude Center of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance in the United States [27], the avian
influenza database from the OIE [28] and the Emergency Prevention System against transboundary
animal and plant pests and diseases (EMPRES) Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i)
from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations [29]. Data from the systematic
surveillance program, ongoing since 2009, include monthly non-random samples for individual birds
from commercial and backyard farms, as well as abattoirs and live bird markets (LBM). The OIE data,
covering 2007 to February 2008, include reported outbreaks for flocks from commercial farms, backyard
farms, and LBMs. The EMPRES-i data, from February 2008 to 2015, include reported outbreaks for
flocks, but the majority do not record the habitat. The systematic surveillance program is the only
data source that tests for and reports co-infection. For consistency, records for individual birds were
aggregated into outbreaks based on location and date, with duplicates between data sources removed.
Outbreaks were geocoded to the scale of individual farms, except for the systematic surveillance data
which were geocoded to villages (see Figure 1). The bulk of the outbreaks from all three data sources
were collected in seven governorates in Northern Egypt, representing the primary foci of the poultry
industry [19].
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The ecological dataset represents environment, population, and behavior variables relevant to
the ecology of influenza, primarily collected via remote sensing. Several studies have successfully
modeled avian influenza niches using environmental variables. Researchers modeling HPAI in Japan
used temperature, precipitation, elevation, and poultry density, finding the last two most strongly
correlated with the distribution of avian influenza [30]. Others modeled the ecological niche of avian
influenza in the Middle East using only remotely-sensed vegetation indices and elevation data [31].
Models developed for Europe and India have also found slope, temperature ranges, and human
population data to be useful [32,33]. Humidity has been shown to play a role in virus persistence and
transmission effectiveness [34], and models of H5N1 in China, Vietnam, Thailand, and Madagascar
used distance to fresh water and distance to major roads as predictive variables [35,36]. One study that
developed a model for H5N1 in Egypt concluded that information on demographics related to poultry
holdings is necessary to improve predictions [37].
Only publicly available datasets with wide geographic (preferably global) coverage and moderate
spatial resolution were selected (see Table 1). Climatic and other remotely-sensed variables
included relative humidity, precipitation, air temperature, surface temperature, elevation (and slope),
and a vegetation index. Average annual relative humidity was obtained from the Center for
Sustainability and the Global Environment (SAGE) at the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s Atlas of
the Biosphere (AoB) database, and was selected for its impact on viral persistence and transmission
effectiveness [34]. Total annual precipitation and monthly average air temperature came from the
WorldClim database, both relevant to viral survival [30]. Mean seasonal and annual diurnal surface
temperature and the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) were derived from remotely
sensed data acquired by NASA’s Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) sensor
on the TERRA satellite [38]. Diurnal temperature may be associated with both viral persistence and
with movements of migratory birds, a theorized source of viral diffusion [33,39]. NDVI is a measure of
“greenness” or vegetation health, and represents host habitat suitability [31]. Data were downloaded
in tiles and mosaicked together, then monthly values were aggregated to seasonal/annual values.
Elevation and slope data were derived from NASA’s Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM)
30-meter digital elevation model (DEM) processed and distributed by the Consultative Group for
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) Consortium for Spatial Infrastructure (CGIAR-CSI),
and influence habitat suitability and migratory pathways for waterfowl [30,33,35].
Table 1. Environmental/ecological data resolutions and sources.
Dataset PotentialRelevance Spatial Resolution Timeframe Source
Relative Humidity
Viral Persistence
and Transmission
[34]
5 arcminutes 1960–1990
Center for Sustainability
and the Global
Environment (SAGE) Atlas
of the Biosphere (AoB)
Mean Air Temp Viral Persistence[30] 30 arcseconds 1960–1990 WORLDCLIM
Total Precipitation Viral Persistence[30] 30 arcseconds 1960–1990 WORLDCLIM
Mean Diurnal
Surface Temp
Viral Persistence
and Diffusion
[33,39]
3 arcminutes 2009–2014
Moderate Resolution
Imaging
Spectroradiometer
(MODIS)
Normalized
Difference
Vegetation Index
(NDVI)
Habitat Suitability
for Hosts [31] 30 arcseconds 2009–2014 MODIS
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Table 1. Cont.
Dataset PotentialRelevance Spatial Resolution Timeframe Source
Elevation Diffusion of Hosts[30,35] 30 arcseconds 2000
Shuttle Radar Topography
Mission (SRTM)
Population
(Human)
Indication of
Poultry Trade
[33,40]
3 arcseconds 2010 WorldPop
Live Bird Markets Viral Mixing andDiffusion [41] 3 arcseconds 2009–2015 Systematic Surveillance
Poultry Density Viral Transmissionand Diffusion [40] 3 arcminutes 2005
Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO)
Fresh Water
and Roads
Viral & Host
Diffusion [33,35]
1:1,000,000,
1:50,000 1992, 2015
Defense Mapping
Agency’s (DMA) Digital
Chart of the World (DCW),
OpenStreetMap (OSM)
Wealth Index
Biosecurity and
Disease Mitigation
[42]
Demographic and
Health Survey
(DHS) Clusters
2008 DHS
Water Scarcity
Habitat Suitability
and Host Diffusion
[42]
DHS Clusters 2008 DHS
Poultry Husbandry Biosecurity [32] DHS Clusters 2008 DHS
Distance to fresh water (important for waterfowl diffusion) and distance to major roads (important
for poultry diffusion) were calculated, as well as distance to LBM within the study area, which may
play a role in viral mixing and diffusion [33,35,41]. Both perennial water sources and roads data were
obtained from the Defense Mapping Agency’s (DMA) Digital Chart of the World (DCW) available
through the DIVA-GIS group [43]. These data were collected in 1992, so supplemental roads data
derived from OpenStreetMap were also used [44]. The locations of LBM within the study area
were derived from the systematic surveillance dataset, which yielded 76 markets and is believed to
be representative.
Demographic information included populations of humans and poultry, a wealth index
measurement, a measure of water scarcity, and bird husbandry variables including whether chickens
and ducks were kept in separate flocks or allowed to mix, and if birds lived in or near homes.
Human population data (2010, partially derived from remote sensing datasets) was obtained from
WorldPop [45], and serves as an indication of the poultry trade [33,40]. Poultry density (2005) was
obtained from the FAO’s Gridded Livestock of the World dataset, representing both commercial
and backyard poultry [46]. Poultry density has been linked to viral transmission and diffusion [40].
The Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 2008 provided the wealth index, information
on the frequency of water scarcity, and bird husbandry behavior [13]. The wealth index and
husbandry data are indications of biosecurity practices and the knowledge of and ability to implement
appropriate disease mitigation strategies [32,42]. Water scarcity is important for habitat suitability,
and may influence host diffusion and mixing [42]. Individual survey responses are geocoded to
centroids of “DHS clusters” which represent spatial groupings of survey responses. Responses were
aggregated to clusters and converted to a raster surface using empirical Bayesian kriging in ArcGIS 10.3
(Esri, Redlands, CA, USA) [47].
Most of the raster data was subset from global datasets at a resolution of 30 × 30 arcseconds,
corresponding to about 0.8 square kilometer grid cells at the equator. Humidity and poultry density
raster layers were of lower resolution (5 and 3 arcminutes respectively), but were resampled to match
the spatial resolution of the other layers.
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We employed ENM to identify a set of environmental conditions associated with virus persistence
and spread [48]. ENM examines the environmental data at locations of outbreaks and creates a model
of the virus’ niche, which is evaluated and improved using randomly selected background points
within the study area [49]. A large number of modeling algorithms are available with varying strengths
and weaknesses, including regression-based models and machine learning methods [50,51]. We chose
the maximum entropy modeling algorithm, which is robust to multicollinearity among input variables,
and has been found to provide more conservative estimates of species niches than other common
algorithms, including the Genetic Algorithm for Rule-set Production (GARP) and bioclimate analysis
and prediction system (BIOCLIM), even with small sample sizes [52–55]. Presence-only models
were created for outbreaks between 2007 and 2015 in Northern Egypt according to virus subtype,
and co-infection potential maps were derived from them (see Figure 2).
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with rectangles indicating data used for model testing or validation.
Two main subtype models were created, one for H5N1 outbreaks, and one for H9N2 outbreaks,
with known co-infection outbreaks omitted from preliminary analyses for subsequent evaluation
of model performance. Models were parameterized to use 75% of outbreak locations for training
and withhold 25% for testing, with 10,000 randomly selected background points as pseudo-absence
locations. Niche models are sensitive to the locations of training points and have a tendency to over-fit
the data. To evaluate the transferability of the niche estimates (i.e., how useful the estimates are outside
the original study area) the study area was divided into quadrants with the first and third quadrants
used for training and the second and fourth for testing, resulting in two additional models, one for
H5N1 and one for H9N2 [54,56]. The niche estimates for the two subtypes, H5N1 and H9N2, were also
combined to identify areas where hosts may be more susceptible to co-infection [57]. Two combinations
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were performed, multiplication and averaging. Multiplication creates a more focused map, and has
the benefit of preserving “true zeros” where we would not expect to find one of the subtypes, making
co-infection very unlikely. Averaging allows for high values in one niche to compensate for low values
in the other, resulting in a larger area being assigned high co-infection potential. An independent
dataset of actual co-infection occurrences during the study period was also used to create a co-infection
niche model for comparison with the derived maps. A total of seven models were created: two for
H5N1, two for H9N2, one for co-infection, and two models derived by combining the H5N1 and H9N2
models. Additional models that could not be properly validated were also created and are reported in
the Supplemental Materials.
For all models a maximum of 10,000 iterations were performed to allow time for convergence.
Jackknife tests were also performed where each variable was removed from the model in turn, and also
used alone, to evaluate each variable’s importance to the model. Models were evaluated using the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve and the corresponding area under the curve (AUC) values.
The ROC curve plots the true positive rate (sensitivity) against the false positive rate (1-specificity)
at various thresholds, and the AUC measures the overall strength of the model, with values below
0.5 regarded as worse than a random model and values close to 1 representing a near-perfect model.
One hundred bootstrap AUC calculations were performed to estimate the standard error and bias of
these measures.
Niche equivalency and background similarity tests were performed for pairs of niche estimates
using the I metric proposed by Warren et al. (2008), based on Hellinger distances, carried out using
the phyloclim (v 0.9-4) package in R [58,59]. I ranges from 0 (no overlap) to 1 (niches are identical).
p-values and confidence intervals (CI) for I were based on 100 permutations, shown previously to
be sufficient to reject the null hypothesis of niche equivalence with high confidence [59]. Statistically
significant results indicate the niche models tested are not identical/equivalent. The CI show the range
of I values expected by chance, so values falling outside the CI indicate the niche models are more
similar (above the CI) or different (below the CI) than expected by chance.
3. Results
By host, the majority of outbreaks were reported among chickens (n = 974), with the remainder
made up of ducks (n = 395), mixed chickens and ducks (n = 725), other species, including geese,
pigeons, quails, and turkeys (n = 77), or unspecified (n = 421). By habitat, outbreaks were recorded at
backyard farms (n = 275), commercial farms (n = 202), live bird markets (n = 45), or other/unspecified
(n = 2070) (see Table 2). The large number of outbreaks for which habitats and/or hosts were not
recorded, exacerbating already small sample sizes when divided by subtype, made validating results
of these models unreliable, however they are reported in the Supplemental Materials.
Table 2. Breakdown of avian influenza outbreaks (percentages by row).
H5N1 H9N2 Co-Infection Total
Source
Systematic Surveillance 145 39 57 241
World Organization for
Animal Health (OIE) 287 0 0 287
EMPRES-i 1997 67 0 2064
Habitat
Commercial 133 (65.84) 28 (13.86) 41 (20.30) 202
Backyard 261 (94.91) 6 (2.18) 8 (2.91) 275
Live-bird Market 32 (71.11) 5 (11.11) 8 (17.78) 45
Other/Unspecified 2003 (96.76) 67 (3.34) 0 2070
Host
Chicken 822 (84.39) 100 (10.27) 52 (5.34) 974
Duck 390 (98.73) 1 (0.25) 4 (1.01) 395
Mixed 724 (99.86) 0 1 (0.14) 725
Other/Unspecified 493 (99.00) 5 (1.00) 0 498
Total - 2429 (93.71) 106 (4.09) 57 (2.20) 2592
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The AUC results for all of the models are reported in Table 3. The maps of co-infection potential
created by multiplying and averaging the H5N1 and H9N2 niche estimates were evaluated using actual
co-infection occurrences that were independent from the datasets used during training. The co-infection
occurrences (n = 57) were used as presence locations vs. randomly selected background points in
AUC calculations for the H5N1 niche, the H9N2 niche and the combined co-infection potential maps.
The H5N1 niche had an AUC of 0.9276, the H9N2 niche had an AUC of 0.9379, and the H5_H9 niche
had an AUC of 0.9918. Testing against co-infection occurrences, the H5N1 niche had an AUC of 0.9784
while the H9N2 niche had an AUC of 0.9923. The co-infection potential map using multiplication
achieved an AUC of 0.9948, while the map using averaging of H5N1 and H9N2 achieved an AUC
of 0.9939.
Table 3. Area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (AUC) for avian influenza
niche models.
Dataset (Subset) AUC Bias Standard Error
H5N1 0.9276 −0.0005 0.0035
H5N1 (Quadrant Test) 0.7413 0.0003 0.0087
H9N2 0.9379 0.0003 0.0260
H9N2 (Quadrant Test) 0.6902 −0.0049 0.0485
Co-Infections 0.9918 0.00008 0.0078
H5N1 × H9N2 1 0.9948 −0.00002 0.0015
Mean H5N1 & H9N2 1 0.9939 0.0004 0.0020
H5N1 1 0.9784 −0.0006 0.0044
H9N2 1 0.9923 0.0001 0.0022
1 Tested using co-infection occurrences.
The estimated distribution of areas suitable for H5N1 and H9N2, as predicted by the niche models,
are shown in Figures 3 and 4. The niche estimate for co-infection cases is depicted in Figure 5. Figure 6
shows the maps of co-infection potential derived from the niche estimates for H5N1 and H9N2 by
multiplication and averaging. Niche equivalency and background similarity test results are shown in
Table 4. All model comparisons using the I metric (H5N1 vs. H9N2, H5N1 vs. co-infection, and H9N2
vs. co-infection) were less than 1 and statistically significant and, therefore, non-equivalent.
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Table 4. Niche equivalency and background similarity tests for niche models.
Comparison (X vs. Y) I Metric X vs. Random Y Y vs. Random X
H5N1 vs. H9N2 0.892 1 (0.673, 0.763) (0.754, 0.762)
Co-Infection vs. H5N1 0.478 1 (0.261, 0.272) (0.677, 0.780)
Co-Infection vs. H9N2 0.514 1 (0.185, 0.272) (0.682, 0.789)
1 Significance: p < 0.001.
Jackknife tests are summarized in Figures 7–9. The strongest single contributor to the H5N1
niche was human population, which was also the variable that caused the largest loss in AUC
when it was removed from the model. Mean diurnal surface temperature (summer and winter),
Elevation, and mean NDVI (summer and winter) were also strong contributors. For the H9N2 model,
the strongest single contributor was mean summer NDVI, followed by Poultry density and water
scarcity. The largest drop in AUC accompanied the removal of elevation from the model. The highest
overall AUC for the H9N2 model was achieved by the full model after removing Distance to major
highways. In both models, air temperatures, precipitation measurements, and distance to fresh water
were generally poor contributors. The strongest contributor to the co-infection niche was distance
to LBM, followed by human population and elevation. The largest drop in AUC coincided with
the removal of the wealth index.
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4. Discussion
The AUC for the co-infection potential maps were higher than the corresponding
co-infection-AUC for individual subtype niche models, demonstrating that the method here outlined
of combining single-subtype niche estimates is more effective at predicting co-infection occurrences
than using single-subtype estimates alone. Furthermore, the derived maps were marginally more
effective than the niche estimate created using co-infection cases, with a higher predicted AUC and
smaller standard error.
All models achieved better than random AUC scores (i.e., above 0.5). Transferability was evaluated
via the quadrant analyses. H9N2 resulted in an AUC drop from 0.9379 for the full model to 0.6902
by quadrants, indicating some overfitting of the training data. Similarly, the quadrant analysis for
H5N1 resulted in an AUC drop from 0.9276 to 0.7413. These differences were significant (t-test,
both p < 0.001), yet the AUC values for the quadrant models were still above 0.5, suggesting the
models could be used in other study areas with environments similar to Northern Egypt, such as
Northern Nigeria.
As expected, the map derived using multiplication resulted in a much narrower area of
co-infection potential when compared with the averaged map (see Figure 5). Multiplying the
single subtype niche estimates produces a more conservative map, only highlighting areas that
were considered highly suitable in both models. This may more accurately reflect co-infection potential
since we would not expect co-infection to occur in an area that’s only likely to support one subtype.
The averaging method produces a more encompassing map, recognizing co-infections may occur
outside the overlapping areas of the identified niches. In this study both maps were effective at
predicting actual co-infection cases, but the multiplication-based map achieved a higher AUC with
a lower standard error. The averaged map seemed to over-estimate the area of co-infection potential,
resulting in its lower AUC and higher standard error, but there are times when this behavior might be
desirable, (e.g., planning containment strategies). For intervention planning purposes, both maps are
likely to be useful.
The niche equivalency tests showed the H5N1, H9N2, and co-infection niche models were not
identical, but the background similarity tests demonstrated non-reciprocal relationships. The H5N1
and H9N2 models were more similar than expected by chance, the co-infection model was more similar
to H5N1 and H9N2 than expected by chance, but the H5N1 and H9N2 models were more different
from the co-infection model than expected by chance. Since the test compares probability distributions
for one model against a randomized background derived from the second model, this result may
simply reflect the nature of the co-infection niche as a “subset” of the single subtype niches. The smaller
sample size of the co-infection niche may also play a role. In general, we would expect the different
subtype niches to be more similar than expected by chance.
The contributions of the different variables to the niche models are somewhat difficult to tease out.
When predictor variables are correlated (as some of those included are), results from jackknife tests
should be interpreted with caution. Among the various models, remotely-sensed datasets made up
the majority of the strongest contributing variables: human population (partially derived from remote
sensing data), mean seasonal diurnal surface temperatures, elevation, and mean seasonal NDVI were
all consistently strong contributors to the models. It may also be helpful to know which variables were
poor contributors and can be omitted from future modeling efforts, including distance to fresh water
and air temperature. Precipitation was also a moderate to poor predictor in our models, in contrast to
recent modeling efforts in the Middle East which found seasonal precipitation to be the most important
predictor for H5N1 [37]. This could be a result of the coarse spatial resolution used in the previous
study (9 km2 compared to ~0.8 km2), or perhaps reflect our inclusion of NDVI which better captures
vegetation health and available moisture than precipitation.
The H5N1 and H9N2 models differed markedly, as can be seen from their niche estimates
(see Figures 3 and 4) and jackknife results (Figures 7 and 8). The H5N1 niche closely follows the
Nile River and delta, with the desert oasis of Fayoum (southwest of Cairo) and portions of the
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Mediterranean coast having high H5N1 outbreak potential. The H9N2 niche, in contrast, appears
more irregular and covers a much smaller geographic footprint. Human population is the strongest
predictor for H5N1, but ranks sixth for H9N2, while mean summer NDVI is the most important
predictor for H9N2, but ranks sixth for H5N1. Among their top five predictors, H5N1 and H9N2
only share two in common, mean summer diurnal surface temperature and mean winter NDVI. It is
not yet clear what is causing these differences, although niche estimates differing by subtype has
been reported previously [57]. It is possible that some of the differences are attributable to the fact
H9N2 (2011) emerged more recently than H5N1 (2006) and may not yet be in equilibrium with the
environment; that is, H9N2 may still be spreading geographically compared to the more saturated
and stable H5N1 distribution, which would increase the uncertainty associated with the model [23,50].
A larger dataset covering a longer time period is required to properly address this possibility and
assess the spatial and environmental stability of the niches over time.
Co-infection potential appears to be highest in areas with low to medium human population,
moderate mean seasonal diurnal surface temperatures, low elevations, and low mean seasonal NDVI
values. Distance to LBM was only a moderate contributor to the single-subtype models, but was the
single best predictor for the co-infection model. This may indicate LBMs play a role in facilitating
co-infection, a possibility supported by previous studies in Thailand and China, and one which
deserves further investigation [60,61].
Sampling biases in the influenza surveillance datasets are a continuing problem. Outbreaks
from backyard farms are underreported, and the non-random nature of the systematic surveillance
sampling likely impacts the results of the current work. In practice, perfect surveillance programs are
unrealistic and researchers are required to make do with available data. Results from this work may
help demonstrate shortcomings of current surveillance efforts in Egypt, particularly by presenting
areas where outbreaks are predicted yet sampling is sparse or non-existent.
It should be remembered that several of the models were constrained by small sample sizes,
and therefore are less generalizable in their results. The standard error (SE) estimates accompanying
the AUC results are an indication of the reliability of the models, with the H5N1 model having
the smallest SE, and the H9N2 model having the largest. The limited precision of the geographic
coordinates recorded for the co-infection outbreaks, and the resolution of the environmental data
restricted analysis to approximately the village scale. Furthermore, while influenza infections spread
very rapidly within flocks, co-infection within poultry flocks does not guarantee co-infection within
individual birds, a prerequisite for reassortment events [62]. Despite these limitations, the methods
outlined were able to predict locations with increased co-infection potential with a high degree of
accuracy, suggesting similar efforts directed towards future outbreaks may be able to do the same.
5. Conclusions
This work contributes to our understanding of the role of landscapes on the ecology of the avian
influenza virus in Egypt. Using primarily remotely-sensed data and ecological niche modeling we
identified environmental, behavioral, and population characteristics which distinguish the niches of
H5N1 and H9N2 subtypes within Egypt. H5N1 and H9N2 were found to differ markedly in their
ecological niches and geographic distributions. Distance to LBM was found to be a strong predictor
for the co-infection niche model. Using only single-subtype influenza outbreaks and publicly available
ecological data, we identified areas of co-infection potential with high accuracy. Our method will
enable researchers to quickly and inexpensively identify areas conducive to influenza co-infections,
helping to target spaces for increased surveillance for novel strains and focusing limited resources
during intervention campaigns.
The importance of accurately targeted influenza surveillance efforts and associated
early-intervention strategies cannot be overstated [27]. The methods outlined provide valuable
tools for finding useful environmental predictors and identifying areas where co-infection potential is
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2016, 13, 886 14 of 17
highest. The theory and techniques used can be applied to avian influenza in other localities, as well
as other infectious diseases with similar social and environmental drivers.
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